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A. DAN TARLOCK*

The Making of Federal Coal Policy:
Lessons for Public Lands
Management From a Failed

Program, An Essay and ReviewINTRODUCTION: COAL POLICY BECOMES THE KEYSTONE OF
NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY

By the middle of this century, oil and gas had replaced coal as the
nation's primary fuels. Before 1920, coal supplied eighty percent of the
nation's energy needs. By 1940, the percentage had fallen to fifty percent,
and after World War II coal was primarily used for boilers and coking,
and supplied a constant eighteen percent of the nation's energy needs.
Most of the demand for coal was met by labor-intensive eastern and
midwestern coal reserves. Huge reserves' existed in the far west, but
there was little demand for them because of their low energy content and
remote location. In the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson
administrations, the coal industry and government made tentative efforts
to revive or at least stabilize the industry. The oil and gas industry,
however, made sure that little was done to subsidize the coal industry
and hindered debate on a nonpetroleum-based national energy policy in
which coal played an enhanced role.2 In retrospect, the oil and gas in*Professor of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology Chicago- Kent College of Law; Raymond A.
Rice Distinguished Visiting Professor, University of Kansas School of Law, Fall 1985.
tThe Making of Federal Coal Policy. Robert Nelson. Durham: Duke University Press. 1983. Pp.
261.
1. The meaning of reserves varies. The most conservative definition is proven reserves, those
resources that are recoverable at the current competitive costs using present technologies. Domestic
proven reserves are estimated to be 260 billion short tons. Inferred and potential undiscovered
reserves raise the total reserve figure to 1,803 billion tons. S. ScHURR, J. DAPMSTADTER, H. P RY,
W. RAMSAY & M. RUSSELL, ENERGY INAMERICA'S FutUR: THE CHOICES BEFORE Us 225-28 (1979).
See generally M. ADELMAN, J. HOUGHTON, G. KAUFMAN & M. ZIMMERMAN, ENERGY RESOURCES IN
AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE: COAL, GAS, OIL, AND URANIUM SUPPLY FORECASTING

(1983).

2. The most intense discussion of energy policy and possible government options between the
end of World War II and 1973 occurred during the Truman administration. The coal industry argued
that the switch to oil and gas was temporary and that the nation's long-run energy future lay with
coal, starting perhaps as early as 1960. The coal industry, however, did not push for special subsidies
such as supply restrictions. Rather, it argued that the government should eliminate subsidies to oil
and gas, such as the depletion allowance and the low transportation costs of gas compared to coal.
The coal industry also supported Secretary of the Interior Julius Krug's efforts, opposed by the
petroleum industry, to develop a government synthetic fuels program. See Goodwin, Truman Admin-
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dustry's self interest and the nation's coincided. On the merits, the case
for the extensive use of coal was weak.
The comparative merits of energy resources are generally evaluated by
five criteria: (1) the costs of reserve acquisition, extraction, and distribution, (2) the environmental and safety costs of these activities, (3)
conversion efficiency, (4) the abundance of reserves, and (5) the security
of reserves. If reserves are defined as domestic reserves, coal is superior
to oil and gas by the last two criteria, abundance and security. The coal
industry has always pressed its case on these two criteria, but coal's
advantages were outweighed by oil and gas's superiority in the first three.
The weakness of domestic oil and gas reserves was not widely perceived
as a serious problem. Experts have periodically worried about oil and
gas shortages, but throughout this century prior to the 1970s, the United
States energy policy, such as it was, gave two reasons not to compel
energy consumers to switch back to coal: domestic oil and gas reserves
could be supplemented with foreign reserves, and any slack in oil and
gas supply and energy demand would be taken up by nuclear power.3
The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries' (OPEC) shortlived
ability to function as an international cartel caused the United States to
rethink its historic strategy of energy interdependence. In addition, growing public opposition to nuclear power made it prudent to reevaluate the
nuclear dream that had been force-fed to an initially reluctant industry
by the federal government. OPEC succeeded in shocking the United States
because its power coincided with a long projected decline in the ratios
of domestic petroleum reserves to production. Oil and gas reserves started
to decline in 1967, with the exception of the Alaskan discoveries in 1970.
Oil and gas reserves experienced their greatest decline between 1970 and
1975.' After the 1973 OPEC embargo, the President and Congress reversed our historic policy of energy interdependence in great haste and
replaced it with one based on energy independence. Government and
istrationPolicies Toward ParticularEnergy Sources, in ENERGY POLICY IN PERSPECrIVE: TODAY'S
PROBLEMS, YESTERDAY'S SOLUTION (C. Goodwin ed. 1980). By the Kennedy administration, the
coal industry began to couch the case for coal in the context of the need for a national fuels policy,
but the petroleum industry opposed the development of a national policy. Barber, Studied Inaction
in the Kennedy Years, Id. at 287, 291-94. During the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, federal
research funds were allocated to find ways to make coal use more attractive to consumers, but the
scale of federal efforts did not match the resources available to the Atomic Energy Commission to
promote nuclear energy. A good deal of the coal industry's time was spent fighting increases in oil
imports. Cochrane, Energy Policy in the Johnson Administration:Logical Order versus Economic
Pluralism, Id. at 337, 380-92.
3. The three leading assessments of national energy policy are: (1) National Academy of Science,
Committee on Nuclear and Alternative Energy Systems, Energy tn Transition 1985-2010: Final
Report (1979); (2) National Academy of Sciences, Committee on Nuclear and Alternative Energy
Systems, Energy in America's Future: The Choices Before Us (1979); and (3) D. Yergen, Energy
for the-Future (1979). Only the Yergen study was somewhat skeptical of a massive and quick shift
to coal.
4. ENERGY IN AMERICA'S FUTURE, supra note 1, at 233.
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independent experts agreed that coal should be a major replacement for
imported oil and gas.'
Western coal was a target for rapid exploitation. These reserves had
already become attractive to utilities in the late 1960s after newly imposed
air pollution requirements created incentives to trade low energy efficiency
for environmentally superior coal of low sulfur content. Western coal was
further attractive because mining costs were lower. Thick seams near the
surface can be easily strip-mined. The industry is not labor intensive, and
sixty percent of the resources are owned by the federal government and
open to easy leasing.6 In the 1970s, it seemed as if the federal government
was in a unique position to use its energy resources. to respond quickly
to the perceived end of the petroleum era by using large amounts of
federal coal
as a bridge to a new era of reliance on non-renewable re7
sources.

THE FAILURE OF THE FEDERAL COAL LEASING PROGRAM: WHY?
The federal coal leasing program implemented in the 1970s has not
achieved its stated objectives and has resulted in a misallocation of resources. As of 1984, federal coal still had not played a major role in
meeting either total national energy supply demands or even in meeting
total coal supply demands. Federal coal accounted for only twelve percent
of the total United States production in 1982. The program has failed to
coordinate coal development with other government objectives such as
environmental protection. The program, moreover, has not achieved a
satisfactory return to the federal treasury. All three branches of government must share the blame for failure of the federal coal program. The
Department of the Interior's (USDI) attempts to develop a national coal
leasing progam failed in part because USDI could not agree on a set of
workable and consistent conceptual underpinnings for the program. Administrative attempts also failed because of well-meaning but inept judicial intervention and political and economic events beyond the
Department's control. Congress must also bear a good part of the blame.
Congress never settled on a consistent coal use policy,8 and finally, after
5. President Carter's ill-fated national energy plan had three overall objectives. The short-term
objective was to decrease our dependence on imported oil; the long-term objective was to move to
secure renewable resources, for example, solar energy; and the mid-term objective was to accomplish
the long-term objective largely through increased usage of coal. Coal conservation was to be induced
by a combination of taxes and regulations. Executive Office of the President, National Energy Plan

xi-xii, 65 (1977).
6. Tarlock, Western Coal in Context, 53 U. COLO. L. REv. 315, 318 (1982).
7. C. WISON,' COAL, BRIDGE TO THE FuTruRE: REPORT OF THE WORLD COAL STuDY (1980).
8. Perhaps the most controversial congressional action was the 1977 amendment to the Clean Air
Act that required all utilities to use some form of scrubbing to remove sulfur dioxide. This, of
course, created a substantial disincentive to use cleaner western coal. See B. ACKERMAN & W. HAssLER,
CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AiR or How the Clean Air Act Became a Multi-billion Dollar Bailout for HighSulfur Coal Producers and What Should be Done About It (1982).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 25

1982-83, Congress lost faith in the USDI and attempted to legislate its
own federal policy.' The failure of the federal government to induce the
greater use of federal coal is especially striking because ownership would
seem to predict greater control over the use of the resources.
It took the USDI from 1971 to 1981 to thread its way through the
maze of conflicting interests to put a generally acceptable leasing program
in place, but this grand consensus was dissipated in the Reagan administration. Substantial federal lease blocks were put on the market just as
energy conservation and the worldwide recession caused a sufficient decrease in the demand for petroleum to break OPEC and undermine the
1982 projections for coal use based on steadily rising world oil prices.
The USDI decision to proceed with lease sales and deregulate the elaborate
Ford-Carter leasing process provoked a great deal of controversy in Congress and in the environmental community. Former Secretary of the Interior, James Watt, was forced to form a special commission to determine
if the federal government received fair value for the coal leases.
On a small scale, one can view the failure of the federal coal leasing
program to achieve its objectives as simply another case study in the
triumph of bad men over good programs; on a large scale, one can view
it as a classic tragedy. The failure of the federal coal leasing program
was caused wholly by events beyond the federal government's controlthe decline in OPEC's power due to conservation and worldwide recession, and the consequent depression in the coal industry that continues
today. Both interpretations, however, miss an important lesson of the
program: public land management decisions based on attempts to apply
the bankrupt principles of the progressive conservation movement or its
replacement philosophy, interest group liberalism, carry a high risk of
failure because neither objective criteria for decisions nor effective programs are likely to result. Programs based on market behavior are more
likely to be effective because objectives are clearer and more capable of
implementation. A superb study by a scholar-participant in the federal
program, Dr. Robert Nelson's The Making of FederalCoal Policy,'0 documents this thesis by both an empirical study of the federal coal leasing
9. After the General Accounting Office published a study critical of the USDI's 1982 Powder
River sales, the House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee invoked the emergency withdrawal
section of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. § 1714(c) (1982), to
defer the Fort Union sale in Montana and North Dakota. Subsequently, Congress imposed a moratorium on all further leasing pending the issuance of a Departmental fair value study and an Office
of Technology Assessment study of the adequacy of the leasing program's environmental protection
mechanisms. Department of Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1984, Pub. L.No.
98-146, 97 Stat. 919 (1983). Both of these reports have now been issued. See notes 33 and 48 infra.
See generally McClure, Energy IndependenceThrough Increased UtilizationofAmerican Coal: Goal
of the 98th Congress, 86 W. VA. L. REv. 687 (1984).
10. R. NELSON, THE MAKING OF FEDERAL COAL PoICY. (1983).
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program from the 1971 moratorium to the eve of the resumption of lease
sales in the last days of the Carter administration and a penetrating theoretical critique of contemporary theories oft public land management.
The Making of Federal Coal Policy thus offers some broad lessons for
the future of public lands management because it contradicts many of the
tenets on which current natural resources laws and management programs
are based.
Federal coal policy between 1971 and 1981 represented the triumph
of the progressive conservation movement's ideals at a time when they
were intellectually bankrupt, and no widely accepted replacement theory
had surfaced."' In both Republican and Democratic administrations, federal coal policy subordinated market forces to scientifically-based central
public interest planning. Although the Carter administration framed its
program in the language of conservationism, it tried to sell the program
using the technique of the theory of policy formulation, interest group
liberalism, adopted by critics of the conservation movement. The USDI
achieved some success by bargaining with most interested parties, but it
ultimately discovered the limits of conservationism and interest group
liberalism. Dr. Nelson is one of a group of young, market-oriented natural
resources scholars who stress the value of ideology in policy development.
His most interesting conclusion is not how the bargaining over coal policy
occurred, but that federal coal policy was an American socialist experiment that failed, as have other similar experiments, because of its naive
faith in human perfectability through science.
The verdict of history on the Carter administration may be that it
took the American myths too literally.
The Carter administration came into office determined to banish
traditional political deals and to turn matters over to the experts. It
would be a revival of progressive ideals. President Carter, perhaps
because he had a scientific background himself, reflected habits of
thought and a political approach directly in the line of Presidents
Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. There was a correct answer-at least implicitly the scientific answer-to most policy questions. It was only necessary to assemble the leading authorities and
have them spell out this answer. 2
One illustration of this thinking is the USDI's 1978 definition of "the
maximum economic recovery" of coal within the proposed leasing tract.
After initially rejecting a definition that equated maximum recovery with
what a private company would find profitable, the USDI chose a public
11. Id. at 46-163.
12. Id. at 172.
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utility model that required coal to be mined until the entire mine would
become uneconomic and closed. The position provides good public interest relations, but is bad economics.
[Tihe option chosen by the Department ... would have transferred
the gains from mining profitable seams to subsidize the mining of
unprofitable seams, thus effectively squandering the social benefit of
the first seams. The biggest loser would not have been the private
coal company, but the federal government, in terms of reduced leasesale revenues; the bids for federal coal tracts would be diminished
by the extent to which companies were required to mine unprofitable
seams. If the decision had been fully carried out, many tracts might
have had no value at all to the coal companies and would be unleasable. 3
In 1979, USDI swung back to a seam-by-seam standard initially proposed
by the industry. Although pushed by Congress, USDI declined to regulate
in the conservationist tradition, "mainly for practical reasons; a considerable search had revealed no desirable social objective which. . would
be practical to pursue under the given authority." 4
The thesis that public lands policies must be reoriented toward market
solutions is provocative and controversial. The enduring legacy of the
progressive conservation era, which continues to dominate thinking about
public lands issues, is that public decisionmaking must be comprehensively planned, divorced from private decisionmaking, and freed from
political influence. Gifford Pinchot's Jeremiah-like calls to a higher morality in government service, grounded in the late nineteenth-early twentieth century faith in the fruits of applied science, continue to echo today.
Dr. Nelson, in his book The Making of FederalCoal Policy, summarizes
the conservationist coal leasing program that exerted such a strong hold
on USDI during the 1970s:
The government would plan scientifically the location, timing, rate,
and type of federal coal development. As a concession to American
traditions of private enterprise, the coal might be leased rather than
directly produced by the government. However, coal companies would
mainly carry out details specified in lease terms and subsequent
government instructions. The government would make its own estimates of the amount of federal coal needed for near-term production
and would then lease only this amount. Coal industry or other special
interest pressures would be considered improper influences on leasing
decisions. As far as possible, politics should be excluded; decisions
would be based on the studies of economists and other technical
experts especially knowledgeable about national energy require13. Id. at 190.
14. Id. at 191.
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ments, the demands for federal coal, and the necessary protection
of the environment from coal-mining impacts. 5
The Making of Federal Coal Policy is a balanced, even nuanced, assessment of the reason that federal coal policy evolved the way that it
did. Many previous policy studies did not stress the role of ideology in
policy formulation. Ideology is important, but our political system will
not allow an elite group of experts to operate in a vacuum. "Pure" policies
must always be tempered to gain acceptance by those most affected by
them. To followers of progressivism and the modem administrative state,
the influence of lay "political" concerns is a regrettable tendency to be
resisted. To others this condition is either desirable or at least the only
way that business is done, and thus needs to be understood and channelled.
Progressivism has long been out of fashion among hard-nosed twentieth
century positivists because of its attempt to dismiss the use of political
institutions to advance one's self-interest. The fact that government functions as broker among competing interest groups has been raised to a
public philosophy.' 6 Interest group liberalism supplanted progressivism
as a basis for policy making. In place of the elite and almost religious
idea that a transcendent "public interest" existed, political scientists argued that what, in fact, the government did was to mediate among competing special interests. Federal coal policy is a particularly interesting
case study of the congruence of the two major competing philosophies
of public administration. The Carter administration USDI tried to serve
the national interest in coal development by implementing a conservationist planning program and simultaneously selling this program by acting as mediator among all major, identified interests. The decade of the
1970s "can ... be seen as a drawn-out negotiation over whether federal
coal leasing should lend any support to western coal development." 17 A
decade may not be too long a period to assess a matter such as western
coal development. The necessity for the federal government to "bribe"
a wide variety of interests to support its leasing program can be defended
as a healthy counter to the hasty and economically irrational energypolicy initiatives proposed during the decade because it postponed unnecessary western coal development. Still, the problem with interest group
liberalism is that it "has never offered logically well-constructed reasons
to show why the results of political competition should be an efficient
use of social resources. Instead, there are a number of logical and practical
reasons to doubt that political competition will, in fact, achieve any such
a happy result." 8
15. Id. at 19.
16. Id. at 167-72.
17. Id. at 181.
18. Id. at 214.
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Lawyers have written extensively on the implementation of the federal
coal leasing program and on the legal issues raised by the program. The
Making ofFederalCoal Policy supplements these accounts by explaining
in great detail the reasons for the shifts in program philosophy at different
points in time. This article will not discuss the details of the leasing
program nor recreate Dr. Nelson's fine history. Rather, it will briefly
summarize the evolution of the program from 1971 to 1982, discuss
several key features of the program that Dr. Nelson criticizes, and discuss
his proposals for the reform of coal use and public lands management
generally.
THE EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL COAL LEASING POLICY:
FROM NEGLECT TO SCANDAL
Coal was not a major public land commodity until the 1960s. In the
nineteenth century the railroads were the chief consumers of western coal,
and the Coal Land Act of 1973 provided for the outright sale of coal
lands with prices fixed by the distance from a railroad. Coal was made
a leasable mineral in 1920 after two decades of conservationist arguments
that the federal government should collect royalties on federal resources. 9
Low demand for federal coal after 1920 allowed lessees to control the
pace of federal coal development. Leases were virtually issued on demand. No one paid much attention to federal coal leases until the late
1960s when western coal suddenly became important. The 1967 and 1970
Clean Air Acts created incentives to shift from dirty eastern to clean
western coal; demand for energy was growing throughout the west and
southwest, especially in the Northern High Plains; and large-scale minemouth plants became economically feasible. Not only did western coal
development become important, it became controversial. The pace of
leasing increased just as environmentalists were beginning to join with
western ranching interests to question the need for any substantial western
coal development in light of the projected regional developmental impacts
and other costs such as eastern unemployment. After the Bureau of Land
Management disclosed in 1971 that leased reserves were rapidly increasing but that production was not, the USDI imposed an informal coal
leasing moratorium.2" Originally, USDI expected to put a new leasing
program on line in two years, but it took a decade.
Between 1971 and 1981, USDI oscillated between leasing programs
faithful to the conservationist vision of public resource management and
19. S. HAYs, CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL OF EFFICIENCY: THE PROGRESSIVE CONSRVATION
MOVF.MENT 1890-1920 252-55 (1959).
20. NESON, supra note 10, at 28.
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other programs that let the market dictate leasing levels and confined the
federal role primarily to curing market imperfections. 2" Its first proposed
program was the Energy Minerals Allocation Recommendation System
(EMARS I). EMARS I proposed that USDI determine optimum federal
leasing levels, select the best tracts, and then put them out for lease.
Opposition to EMARS I within USDI resulted in a shift to a more marketoriented approach that gave greater weight to industry tract nominations.
Concern with the morality of speculation, however, ultimately led to a
rejection of a relatively pure free market approach. EMARS I was thus
riddled with inconsistencies from the start. To resolve this tension, Keynesian "planned market liberalism" was substituted for the conservationist
EMARS I. A new program retitled Energy Minerals Activity Recommendation System (EMARS II) was put in place in the hope that it would
provide sufficient incentives to force the coal industry to act in the national
interest. Under EMARS Il the amount leased would be determined by
the total number of bids received in excess of USDI fair value calculations.
EMARS 11 was never tested in practice; it was stillborn because of its
simultaneous judicial invalidation and rejection by the incoming Carter
administration which initially returned to a more elaborate multi-stage
conservationist planning program based on EMARS I concepts.22
Dr. Nelson in The Making of FederalCoal Policy finds that the federal
coal leasing program was fatally flawed for five major reasons: (1) the
EMARS H planned market program was internally inconsistent because
the insistence on anti-speculative due diligence requirements prevented
the long-run efficient allocation of federal coal reserves; (2) even if the
government had eliminated incentives for premature exploitation, USDI
lacked the technical capacity to calculate the long-run value of federal
coal reserves; (3) USDI could not develop a politically acceptable environmental strategy; (4) judicial intervention to promote rational, comprehensive coal development planning, along with the election of President
Carter in 1976, pushed the USDI away from the creation of a planned
market back to true but unworkable progressive conservative comprehensive planning; and (5) the inability to develop sound criteria to determine the fair value of federal coal. Each of the five arguments merits
more extended analysis because they run counter to much legal thinking
on these issues.
21. See Watson, The FederalCoal Follies-A New ProgramEnds (Begins)A Decade ofAnxiety?,
58 DEN. L.J. 65 (1980).
22. U.S.Department of Interior, Secretarial Issue Document: Federal Coal Management Program
(1979). For a detailed description of the Carter administration's program, see Ebzery & Kunz,
FederalCoal Leasing in the 1980s-LessonsLearnedFrom the 1970s, 28 RocKY MT. MIN. L. INST.
315 (1983).
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The Economic Irrationalityof Anti-Speculation Laws
No principle is more firmly embedded in natural resources law than
the prohibition against the acquisition of resources for speculation. In oil
and gas law, the classification of an oil and gas lease as a fee simple
determinable, conditioned on continued production in paying quantities
and the implied covenant of further exploration, serve this purpose. Western water law conditions a water right on the reasonably prompt application of water to a beneficial use and terminates the right when use
ceases. Despite populist monopoly prevention arguments, prohibitions
against speculation make little economic sense and prevent persons from
estimating market demand over a period of time and from acquiring the
necessary resources to supply that demand. Anti-speculative policies seem
to imply that the cost of holding rights is costless and that holders are
insensitive to market signals, such as offers to trade.23
Congress and the USDI have tried to curb speculation in coal leases
by due diligence requirements, but these requirements are undesirable to
coal lessees and society generally. They are undesirable to federal coal
lessees because they require the expenditure of substantial sums of money
in advance of market demand. Society, of course, loses when resources
are allocated inefficiently, but there are two particular inefficiencies that
make the case for elimination of the due diligence requirements, which
are now unfortunately contained in the Coal Leasing Amendments of
1976.24 Due diligence requirements promote environmentally unsound
development because they frustrate the assembly of unified leasing blocks,
and they promote scattered mining. The requirements of due diligence
are likely to prevent the government from capturing the rising, thus
maximum, value of lease blocks:
In bidding for federal leases coal companies cannot bid more than
the current development value of the tract. This is because, if they
actually win the tract, the government's diligent development standard requires rapid development. In short, if the value of a tract is
maximized with future development, coal companies bidding in current lease sales will not be able to offer the full value of the tract.
The government therefore will find itself rejecting company bids for
tracts best developed in the future. In this way federal coal leasing
could in theory at least be limited to the amounts "needed" for
development right away. However, the implementation of such an
approach would require highly sophisticated calculations by both
government and industry. Furthermore, far from making such cal23. For a trenchent criticism of anti-speculative doctrines in water law, see Williams, The Requirement of Beneficial Use as a Cause of Waste in Water Resource Development, 23 NAT. Rs. J.
1, 12-14 (1983).
24. 30 U.S.C. §202a(2) (1982).
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culations, the Interior Department under EMARS II failed even to
recognize the necessity for making them. Instead, in estimating the
value of a coal tract, the Department never proposed to examine
future development prospects. The fair market value of a tract would
be simply calculated to equal the value of the tract if it were developed
right away (or at least fairly promptly). No thought would be given
to whether the tract might have a higher value if it were developed
say 15 or 20 years from now. Hence, despite Interior Department
assertions, under the EMARS II approach every tract offered would
have been leased, so long as government and industry made the same
assumptions and used the same methods for calculating development
value. The EMARS II plan offered no sure mechanism for controlling
the level of leasing, other than limiting the number of tracts offered
for lease initially.'
Technical Capacity to Forecast Coal Demand
Planning efforts to guide future development depend on an accurate
data base. Lawyers who advocate greater mandatory planning often assume that the necessary data is available or that it can be assembled for
a price and give insufficient attention to the costs of information. Only
if this data exists can planners make any pretense to calling their allocations superior to those produced by the market. The lack of adequate
estimates of future coal demand, and of energy price behavior in general,
became critical when the Carter administration tried to apply conservation
planning in earnest. Secretary of the Interior Cecil Andrus rejected a
dominant role for industry in nominating lease tracts and opted for Departmental identification of coal lease tracts tied to Department of Energy
production goals disaggregated to regional levels.2 6 To take advantage of
industry information, industry would be able to nominate specific tracts
for leasing after regional leasing goals were set with the aid of federalstate Regional Coal Teams. The idea was that the USDI would make the
mega decision of screening-out environmentally valuable sites, and industry would advise which of the sites left were cheaper to mine. The
USDI would then be able to control the rate of western coal leasing.2 7
All of this was done at a time when it was thought possible to coordinate
inter-agency efforts to arrive at a rational energy policy. The result was
a political and technical disaster that, in the end, did little more than try
to predict industry behavior while pretending to guide industry. Politically,
efforts to set leasing targets failed to convince environmentalists that there
was even a case for western federal coal development. Technically, Pro25. NELSON, supra note 10, at 161.

26. Id. at 125-28.
27. Id. at 121-22.
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fessor Nelson's conclusion is a testimony tb the value of hands-on experience and common sense. "The Department of Energy spent many
millions of dollars on its energy modeling. It employed graduates of the
finest universities trained in economics, modeling, statistics, and computer science. Yet, in all likelihood, equally accurate forecasts could have
been made by a single individual knowledgeable in the coal industry,
using a hand calculator, with a few days of background inquiries and
data gathering."'
Environmental Protection
In the mid-1970s, federal efforts to achieve energy independence provided the first major test of the strength of the environmental movement,
which had succeeded in making protection of the environment a major
national priority in a remarkably short period of time. The movement's
strength assured that any coal leasing program would have to be consistent
with environmental protection objectives. The question was, what were
these objectives? They ranged from efforts to preserve the West untouched
by human hands to more rational efforts to calculate the measurable
external or social costs of coal development and to make the federal
government and lessees account for these costs at all stages of development.
The USDI first attempted to factor these external costs of coal development into leasing decisions, but it lacked the legal authority to deny a
substantial number of preference leases for environmental reasons. A
person who obtained a prospecting permit and discovered coal was entitled
to a preference lease if the disc6very was of "commercial quantities." 29
The solicitor ruled that the secretary lacked the authority to redefine
"commercial quantities" to include a broad social cost test, and the
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals subsequently agreed with
this construction of the Mineral Leasing Act.30 Environmental protection
would have to come through subsequent lease conditions. Pollution tax
schemes were also considered internally but were not implemented. Instead of a comparative analysis of developmental and environmental values to select only the best sites in different development areas, the Department
in 1977 opted for a conservationist zoning approach. That approach sought
to identify lands unsuitable for mining, to base this decision on a benefit
cost-analysis, and to zone all other lands for leasing.
Land use decisionmaking consistent with previously prepared plans is
widely advocated by proponents of public interest decisionmaking. The
28. Id. at 130-31.
29. Id. at 71-75.
30. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Berklund, 609 F.2d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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planning process and plans will define public objectives and allocate
resources efficiently. Despite powerful criticisms of this argument, federal
coal policy tried to do real progressive land use planning by first deciding
which lands were unsuitable for coal mining. In the Nixon-Ford administration's EMARS II, unsuitability planning was considered to be another
factor in multiple-use decisionmaking; in the Carter administration, the
concept became the basis for large-scale de facto withdrawals and twentytwo national unsuitability criteria were developed.3' The USDI soon learned
what most land use planners and zoning administrators know. The further
in advance of a specific development proposal a land use zoning decision
is made, the more the decision's legitimacy is undermined because there
is a high risk that the decision is wrong. The unsuitability program as
originally conceived was unworkable because it depended on information
that could not be generated in the time necessary to make the decision.
Most communities use a variety of flexible devices that leave all options
open until serious bargaining between a developer and the community
occurs. To decrease the high cost of unsuitability determinations, the
USDI's system soon shifted from a planning process to a similar sitespecific evaluation process:
Thus, there would now be a preliminary screen applied to rule out
particularly obvious areas violating the unsuitability standards and
where there was no real possibility of finding an exception. But most
areas would probably have to be left for "further consideration."
Such consideration might well occur after specific tracts had been
nominated by industry and be limited to the area of the tract. In
short, rather than creating zones well-defined in advance, the emphasis was shifting rapidly back towards case-by-case examination
of individual tract circumstances, i.e., a system of wide administrative discretion.32
The unsuitability process simply defers hard decisions and defeats the
objectives of the program:
Under the present leasing program, unsuitability tends to be viewed
as a "black and white issue" (i.e., a piece of land is either "acceptable" or "unsuitable"). This means that the unsuitability criteria
usually eliminate only those lands with obvious "fatal flaws," giving
careful consideration to the exemptions and exceptions to the criteria
31. The designation of lands unsuitable for surface mining is authorized by § 522 of the Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, and allows the Department of Interior to exclude
coal-bearing lands with high environmental values, such as lands necessary to buffer a national park,
from development. 30 U.S.C. § 1201 (1982). See generallyVan Buskirk & Dragoo, The Designation
of Coal Lands as "Unsuitable" for Surface Mining Operations,27A ROCKY MT. MiN. L. INsT. 339
(1982).
32. NELsON, supra note 10, at 161.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 25

as provided in the regulations. Where an unsuitability decision is not
clear-cut, potential problems are "flagged" to be evaluated in detail
at the activity planning or mine plan review stage when additional
data become available. As a result, there has been little justification
for BLM to "bite the bullet" in application of the unsuitability criteria, and difficult decisions continually have been deferred and the
exceptions and exemptions used extensively. .. "
Land use planning procedures have become even more controversial in
the past four years as a result of former Secretary Watt's attempts to keep
the form of land use planning but not the substance. For example, unsuitability criteria applied only to new leases. A recent Office of Technology Assessment study concludes that the Watt combination of high
regional leasing levels and lessened data standards significantly increased
the risk "that environmentally sensitive tracts would be leased and eventually mined..."'
The JudicialRole in Coal Leasing
In the 1970s, courts began to play a larger role compared to the past
in setting administrative agency agendas. The intellectual supporters of
the New Deal instructed courts to defer to agency expertise, but in the
1960s and 1970s criticism of agency performance induced courts to intervene to force agencies to consider factors that were often ignored or
given little weight in traditional agency missions. Lawyers immediately
became adept at constructing elaborate rationales to support judicial decisions that lowered access barriers and adopted more probing standards
of judicial review. Courts, they argued, promoted representative government by forcing agencies to hear diverse points of view.35 From the early
decisions broadening the scope of specific decisions, it was an inevitable,
but a contradictory, step to ask courts to mandate central planning by
agencies. As a statutory basis courts used the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969,36 although Congress subsequently imposed
more specific planning mandates on the land management agencies.
Two major lawsuits tried to use NEPA to force the USDI to address
all of the mega questions of federal coal leasing. In Kleppe v. Sierra
Club,37 the Court refused to require the preparation of a regional Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for coal leasing in the Northern Great
Plains because no formal regional program existed with the Department.
33. Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), Environmental Protection in the Federal Coal Leasing Program 88 (1984).
34. Id. at 12. See generally Goplerud, FederalCoal Leasing and PartisanPolitics:Alternatives
and the Shadow of Chadha, 86 WEsT VA. L. Rav. 773 (1984).
35. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. Rav. 1667 (1975).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 4321-70 (1982).
37. 427 U.S. 390 (1976).
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The Court, however, in NRDC v. Hughes,38 set aside the USDI's first
programmatic EIS, based on EMARS II. Kleppe has been much criticized
for its cramped reading of NEPA,3 9 and Hughes has been much hailed
as an illustration of the use of NEPA to compel long range planning. 4
In contrast to much legal commentary, Dr. Nelson in The Making of
Federal Coal Policy approves of Kleppe's judicial self-restraint for not
making a bad situation worse, and disapproves of Hughes because the
decision did make a bad situation worse. 4 In 1975, the Sierra Club sued
the USDI because it was not addressing the total impact of accelerated
coal leasing in the Northern Great Plains. Courts had previously held that
under NEPA an agency might have a duty to study alternative aspects of
a problem that the agency lacked the power to implement.42 The problem
with the Sierra Club's suit was that NEPA is not triggered until there is
a major federal action with significant adverse environmental impacts,
and no Northern Great Plains coal leasing program per se existed. Nonetheless, Judge J. Skelly Wright adopted a liberal reading of NEPA and
extended previous cases to hold that a judicial balancing test could be
used to determine if a de facto program existed.4 3 The Supreme Court,
however, rejected this approach in favor of a much more formal approach.
An agency's determination that a program existed or did not was entitled
to great but not conclusive weight.
Kleppe is one of the many attempts to develop a land use planning law
that subordinates regulatory decisions to planning. As was previously
discussed, the progressive argument that land use decisions should be
based on prior plans began to pick up legislative and judicial support in
the 1970s. Initially, courts did not mandate planning, but began to apply
the appellate opinion model of decisionmaking to agencies. Agency explanations were found inadequate because they were not reasoned. NEPA
provided a statutory charter to expand this intervention, and it was a
logical step for environmental plaintiffs to increase the level of required
reasoned decisionmaking by arguing that decisions should be comprehensive and thus planned.' A court cannot formulate a comprehensive
38. 437 F. Supp. 981 (D.C.Cir. 1977).
39. For a typical example of the argument that NEPA planning does not go far enough, see
Coggins & Evans, Multiple Use, Sustained Yield Planningon the PublicLands (pt. 2), 53 U. CoLo.
L. REV. 411, 453-56 (1982).
40. See, e.g., Note, The Scope of the ProgramEIS Requirement: The Needfor a CoherentJudicial
Approach, 30 STAN. L. REv., 767, 789 (1978), and Johnston, Kleppe v. Sierra Club: An Environmental Planning Catch 22, 1 IARv. ENvrL. L. REv. 182 (1976).
41. NELSON, supra note 10, at 107-14.
42. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
43. Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
44. The use of formal definitions of comprehensive rationality as a basis for judicial review is
well analyzed in Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARv. L. REv. 393
(1981).
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plan or review the adequacy of a mandated plan by any acceptable set
of criteria.45 Nonetheless, a federal district court did mandate a new
programmatic EIS for the EMARS II program to prevent long range
planning that went to the heart of the issue-the need for western coal
development-from being frustrated. NRDC v. Hughes enjoined almost
all further coal leasing until a satisfactory EIS was prepared. The court's
reasons were that the EMARS II shift to a planned market was insufficiently explained and that there was no in-depth analysis of the very
necessity of a federal coal leasing program. Ironically, this decision banned
all contingency planning for future leasing. The impact of Hughes was
drastic, but the decision was consistent with the Carter USDI's own
decision to review the basic premise of the federal coal leasing program,
and the need to ship large amounts of western coal east. The USDI did
leasing.4 6
not appeal the decision and settled the case to allow very limited
Fair Value
"No bid shall be accepted which is less than the fair market value as
47
determined by the Secretary, of the coal subject to the lease. " This
section of the Federal Coal Leasing Act Amendments, which does not
define fair value, has produced the greatest source of controversy about
the program as a result of allegations that the USDI's 1982 Powder River
48
lease sales failed to return fair value to the federal government. The
45. Land use planners have long argued that regulation should be subordinate to planning. The
most thorough analysis of the consistency issue advocates the subordination of regulation to planning
to foster meaningful citizen participation in land use decisionmaking, and admits that the existence
of a plan is not per se a basis for judicial deference to the agency that prepared it. J. DiMrro,
THE CONSISTENCY DOCTRINE AND THE LIMrrs OF PLANNING (1980).

46. See Ebzery & Kunz, supra note 22, at 320-23.
47. 30 U.S.C. § 201(a).
48. Secretary of the Interior Cecil Andrus set the 1979 leasing target for this region at 776 million
tons; Secretary Watt initially raised it to 1.4-1.5 billion tons in 1981 and to 2.2 billion tons in 1982,
only 1.6 billion of which were actually offered. The tracts were appraised at $144 million, but $70.7
million was published as an acceptable minimum bid. Coal reserves leased in April and October of
1982 brought $67.18 million in bonus money. At this point the story gets complicated and controversial. The chief charge against the USDI is that it changed bidding levels from minimum acceptable
bids to lower entry level bids and proprietary appraisal information was leaked to some coal company
officials. The Linowes Commission concluded that the activities of high Department officials and
technical appraisal deficiencies did lower the probable return to the government:
The Commission found that the Interior Department experiment with entry level bidding
was a failure. Competition, which was relied on in theory to push up the bids in the
oral auction, did not materialize for most tracts. As a result, the sale itself failed to
produce valid new indicators of fair market value for use in the planned post-sale
appraisal. The pre-sale appraisals thus became the primary basis for bid acceptance
decisions, despite the strong efforts of some policy officials to the contrary. Nevertheless, of two bids that were less than the Interior Department's pre-sale appraisals,
only one bid was rejected. The Commission concluded that whether intentional or not,
the net effect of these failures in the sale procedures was to minimize the likelihood
of securing fair market value for the Powder River coal leases. There is strong evidence
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issue of what is fair value transcends the dispute over the dollars of the
Powder River sale. Congress' insistence on this standard returns public
land commodity policies to the Hamiltonian objective that public lands
revenues should support the federal treasury. From a late twentieth century
perspective, congressional concern with the rate of return on public land
commodity exploitation is new. For more than 100 years the USDI has
been indifferent to the contribution of public lands revenues to the treasuy 49
because all public land policies have been distributive-to the rich as
well as to the poor. Thus, there is very little public land law or customary
tradition to interpret this term.
The determination of fair value is even more complicated by the fact
that the concept is a legal, not an economic, one. Federal coal lease sales
are sales of reserves. Payments to the reserve owner, the federal government, are economic rents in the classic sense of the term. Payments
should reflect the amount necessary to prevent the transfer of the reserves
to other possible uses." If fair value were defined as economic rent, it
would be necessary to induce or construct a hypothetical negotiation
among all public and private reserve owners and all bidders to find "an
equilibrium ... where no potential coal producer could be better off by
moving to any deposit, and no coal owner could find another producer
willing to pay more for this coal."'" Reserve rent and, thus, fair value
would be determined. This, of course, did not and is unlikely to happen.
Fair market value, therefore, more accurately refers to a process of value

determination rather than any numerical result. 2

to suggest that the procedural changes in themselves resulted in bids less than would
have otherwise been submitted. This process severely reduced public confidence that
receipt of fair market value had been pursued in a professional and objective manner.
The Commission also concluded that the Interior Department appraisals for the 1982
sale of Federal coal leases in the Powder River region contained significant technical
deficiencies. Improper appraisal adjustments were made by the Interior Department
for tax treatment of lessees and by halving estimates of captive or bypass tracts
according to the 50/50 split policy. The Department also failed to take account of a
major 1981 tax law change which would have increased its appraisal estimates. The
Commission's corrections for technical deficiencies in Department calculations show
that the bids accepted were substantially less in total than the revised appraisals.
Because the shortfall is sizable, the Commission concluded that, on the basis of this
information alone, the Secretary did not receive a sufficient payment for the coal leases
sold. Nevertheless, correcting for deficiencies in the appraisals resulted in substantial
increases from the Department's original appraised values.
Linowes Commission Report, Fair Market Value Policy for Federal Coal Leasing, 417-19 (1984).
49. The Linowes Commission found that "Government revenues were not among the mentioned
objectives of 1979's leasing system. Indeed, until very recently, the achievement of Government
revenues played little part in debates over appropriate levels of leasing." Fair Market Value Policy
for Federal Coal Leasing, id. at 71.
50. For a good treatment of the concept, see L. Lu'sEY & P. STEWER, ECONOMICS 395-401 (2d ed.
1969).
51. NELSON, supra note 10, at 193.
52. Gulley, The FairMarket Value of FederalCoal, 86 W. VA. L. REv. 741, 750 (1984).
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One cannot simply compare private to federal reserves or use a simple
standard, such as the eminent domain standard, of the price a willing
buyer would pay to a willing seller. A federal coal lease does not transfer
unqualified ownership as an outright mineral sale of a severed estate
would. As a result of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 and the 1976 Coal
Leasing Act Amendments, a lease purchaser must weigh the risks of
noncompliance with due diligence requirements and the ability to knit
the lease tract together with other public and private tracts to obtain an
economically profitable mining unit. 3
Another complicating factor in the fair market value debate is the
characterization of the unique position of the federal government. In many
respects the federal government is just another seller in a competitive
market. The federal government, however, is also the manager of the
public domain, and Congress has imposed statutory duties to consider a
wide range of possible uses so the federal government has no duty to sell
at all. The federal government, moreover, has a duty to coordinate its
sales with the desires of the western states, something that no private
seller has a duty to do. The federal government 4 has been accused of
exercising monopoly power to raise coal prices by underleasing, but a
more accurate characterization of the federal government, in light of the
behavior of western coal markets, is that of "a dumper." 5 5 Concern was
expressed by the Linowes Commission that the federal government could
use its market power in coal reserves to drive federal lease prices to low
levels by high levels of leasing.
Faced with the structural and practical difficulties of determining fair
value, the USDI can make the determination in two ways: (1) the use of
in-house appraisals to set minimum acceptable bids, and (2) control over
the timing of lease sales to prevent, as the Fair Value Commission found
has occurred, too much coal from being leased at any one time because
fair value is, in part, a function of the level of leasing.5 6 Until the resumption of federal coal leasing, the USDI used a simple measure of fair
value, the royalty rate set by the federal government. As the value of
federal coal increased, greater reliance on bonus plus royalty bids occurred, and it became necessary to determine the fair value of up-front
bonus payments. The most common appraisal standard is comparable
sales. Under this standard the fair value, defined as a bonus, was zero
because the royalty rate for federal coal, 12.5 percent, was higher than
for comparable private coal,57 especially in a sluggish market that has
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

NELSON, supra note 10, at 55.
Fair Market Value Policy for Coal Leasing, supra note 48,at 100.
Id. at 115.
NELSON, supra note 10, at 134.
Fair Market Value Policy for Coal Leasing, supra note 48, at 251.
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existed since the federal coal leasing program was resumed. To circumvent
this problem, the USDI has experimented with a discounted cash flow
basis. 8 However, the problem with this method, which is simply central
planning, is that the information requirements are heroic. Changes in
underlying data can throw off all of the calculations and make them
unreliable. For example, one of the reasons stated by the Linowes Commission in its conclusion that the Powder River sale did not produce fair
value is that the USDI failed to take account of 1981 tax changes that
would have increased appraisal estimates. 9
SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE: REFORM OR RESTRUCTURING
PUBLIC LANDS DECISIONMAKING
The question raised by The Making of FederalCoal Policy is what can
be done about the federal coal program where almost every aspect of it
contradicts some other aspect, and in toto seems inherently unworkable.
A complete answer would have to start with Congress, which has saddled
land management agencies with elaborate planning programs but has
provided little guidance on the ultimate use of multiple-use lands. Public
lands policy has evolved from disposition to retention, subject to commodity leasing and comprehensive management. The result has been an
ever more complex and directionless environment of decisionmaking.
The major management guideline, multiple-use, is contentless, and the
superimposition of detailed planning requirements results in only a diffuse, unsystematic redistribution of property rights to diverse user groups
who have new power to veto management choices. Both incremental and
structural reforms are needed.
Dr. Nelson's first suggested incremental reform is to place more reliance on the market to determine the rate of coal leasing. Leasing levels
would be tied to production levels. This would not be a one-for-one
tradeoff, but rather "at any given time there should be a stock of federal
coal leases outstanding which contains substantially greater coal reserves
than are needed for new mines to open anytime soon." ' To implement
this policy, diligence requirements would have to be relaxed, and forecasting would emphasize the long-run plans of utilities and coal companies.
His second short-term recommendation is to apply unsuitability re58. "When suitable comparable sales data cannot be found, th6e Discounted Cash Flow (DCF)
-method is an alternative. DCF analysis estimates the total revenues and total costs associated with
future development of the property being appraised. The resulting net revenue is then "discounted"
back to the sale data at a specified capitalization, or discount, rate to estimate the "present value"
of the property." Fair Market Value Policy for Federal Coal Leasing, supra note 48, at 247.
59. Fair Market Value Policy for Federal Coal Leasing, supra note 48, at 418.
60. NELSON, supra note 10, at 221.
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quirements only to land that actually has a high probability of being
mined." Unsuitability criteria would be simplified and ranked so that
coal lands with high environmental values can be removed early ii the
process. Lands with more marginal environmental values would be protected in comparison to expressions of leasing interest. Greater, but not
total, reliance would be placed on industry nominations. To get out of
the fair value quandary, Dr. Nelson proposes the use of minimum price
bids to insure that only high quality coal tracts would be leased. "Poorer
tracts could not meet the minimum bid required, thereby preventing long
term speculation in federal coal reserves. "62 A fourth recommendation is
the repeal or modification of the surface owner consent requirement. 63
The federal government retains the mineral fee in a great deal of coal
underlying lands that were transferred into private ownership. In 1976,
Congress gave surface owners an absolute veto over mining.' 4 Attempts
to accommodate this serious surface-mineral conflict through compensation were rejected. 6 1 Surface owner consent is a major transfer of property rights to overlying owners, and is much beloved by environmentalists
because it substantially increases the transaction costs for a winning federal lessee. For this reason, the surface owner consent provisions create
a major barrier to competition by discouraging bids for federal coal where
the bidder lacks the exclusive consent. The consent provisions also make
effective land use planning difficult.' The surface owner consent requirement, however, may be an unplanned market solution because it does
create incentives to seek coal development.6 7 Nonetheless, five out of
nineteen tracts in the Powder River sale were dropped from the final list
because surface owner consent could not be obtained.6 8
The Making of FederalCoal Policy concludes with a radical proposal:
"The best way to ensure that ... prime federal coal is put to efficient
and productive use would be to sell it to the private sector by competitive
bidding. The federal government would retain a royalty of perhaps 5
percent-all going to the U.S. Treasury." 69 To many, this proposal will
be Swiftian or at least sound hollow in light of the demise of the USDI's
recent attempt to dispose of substantial amounts of public land.7' The
61. Id. at 223.
62. Id. at 224.
63. Id. at 225.
64. 30 U.S.C. § 1304(c)(1982).
65. NELsoN, supra note 10, at 184.
66. Id., at 225. See also id. at 183-86.
67. Id. at 184.
68. Fair Market Value Policy for Federal Coal Leasing, supra note 48, at 184.
69. NELSON, supra note 10, at 231.
70. The Department of Interior's ill-fated asset management program attempted to respond to the
Sagebrush Rebellion, a move to transfer large amounts of BLM land to the states, by an idea that
was contradictory to the objectives of the proponents of the Sagebrush rebellion and thus incapable
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idea of selling federal lands subject to antitrust and other refinements
represents a fresh approach to public lands management and builds on
the thinking of many students of the subject. These students are persuaded
that the most defensible purpose of federal public lands commodity programs is the efficient allocation of resources and that management policies
are deficient according to this standard.7' Conservationist approaches to
public lands policy will not promote economic efficiency even if done
"right." 72 If Dr. Nelson and other students of the public lands are right,

which I suspect they are, two conclusions can follow: (1) either the
premise that the primary objective of public lands policy is to promote
resource efficiency must be denied, or (2) new public lands tenures that
promote efficiency must be considered.
Those who object to the lessons drawn above from the federal coal
leasing experie.nce will argue that the public lands policies have always
been redistributive and should continue to be so on an even broader scale.
The history of the last fifteen years can be seen as an expansion of the
beneficiaries who may now claim de facto property rights in the public
lands. The Sierra Club has as much control over wilderness areas as do
holders of grazing permits over range land. The elaborate planning programs can then be justified not in terms of processes that yield the national

interest, but as a redistributive scheme of property rights. Rights are
of mobilizing substantial political support. The asset management program was based on ill-defined
policies developed by students of the public choice school who argue that public resources should
be transferred to private ownership to promote efficiency. The transfer of public lands to private
hands was not what western grazing interests wanted because they might be displaced. Attempts
were made to allow western interests to purchase rights, but these proposals proved extremely
problematic. In a subsequent study of the Sagebrush Rebellion and the privatization movement, Dr.
Nelson observed that privatization would require the clear delineation of winners and losers and that
the outcome might be politically too controversial and thus defeat the objective of privatization:
Indeed, the fundamental problem with the plan to privatize public lands was that these
lands were in fact already substantially privatized. It would be necessary to take back
rights already effectively granted to ranchers, in order to be able to earn any significant
revenue by selling these lands to someone else. If all
those with de facto public land
rights were first taken care of, there would be few if any rights remaining to sell.
Nelson, Seeking Alternatives to Federal Land Ownership: Assessing the Sagebrush Rebellion and
the Privatization Movement 84 (paper presented at the 45th National Conference of the American
Society for Public Administration, Denver, April 8-11, 1984).
71. E.g., Clawson, The FederalLands Revisited, in RrHiNKING FEDERAL LANDS, (Brubaker ed.
1984).
72. THE MAKING OF FEDERAL COAL POLICY is a sharp break with the usual assessment of government planning programs that conclude that the underlying program is sound provided that it is
executed correctly. For example, after the Powder River sale, the Office of Technology Assessment
(OTA) was directed to determine whether the federal coal leasing program is adequate to ensure the
development of coal leases in an environmentally compatible manner. Predictably OTA concluded:
"In principle, the statutory framework and the tiered system concept developed to implement that
framework are capable of assuring adequate environmental protection during the development of
Federal coal leases... However, in practice, implementation of that framework has fallen short."
Environmental Protection in the Federal Coal Leasing Program, supra note 33, at 12.
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widely disbursed but never completely assigned so that winners and losers
are not clearly identified. 73 Under this traditional system, any outcome
is fair so long as the process is fair. 4 History alone, however, cannot be
a sufficient justification for current policies. Perhaps the most significant
lesson that The Making of Federal Coal Policy draws is that the cost of
conservationist-based planning programs is likely to be grossly disproportionate to the value of the resource.75 Even if the objective of public
lands policies is a non-market distribution of rights, there are better and
cheaper ways to achieve that objective. Public lands conflicts are more
and more becoming zero sum games with high opportunity costs.
With the large-scale withdrawals for wilderness, national parks, wild
and scenic rivers, and other national heritage uses, we have arrived at a
relatively firm consensus, with debate still going on at the margin, about
which public lands should be permanently dedicated to non-commodity
production. Because lands have already been withdrawn for particular
non-economic purposes, Dr. Nelson is right when he argues that the case
for continued government ownership and management of lands dedicated
primarily to commodity production is weak. Instead,
"[E]mploying different tenures for different classes of public land
is a potential solution to the competing arguments for private production of commodities and public provision of dispersed recreation.
Where lands are primarily valuable for the former use, then private
tenures could be adopted, and similarly, where dispersed recreation
is the 76most important use, the case is strongest for public ownership."
Whether or not one agrees with the argument for the disposal of commodity-production public lands, the basic insight that modern public land
laws and policies have created a rich, if rather ill-defined, set of new
tenures is a major one. The debate over the future direction of this tenurecreating process can keep the next generation of public lands scholars
fully occupied.
The Making ofFederalCoal Policy is a first-rate example of the power
of the new public lands scholarship. This scholarship has freed itself from
the Miltonian legacy of the progressive conservation era. In traditional
scholarship, there were only angels, advocates of public management,
and devils, "interests" bent on subverting the public interest. Books such
73. NELSON, supra note 10, at 96.
74. This argument is well-developed in Leshy, Sharing FederalMultiple Use Lands-Historic
Lessons and Speculations Forthe Future in Rethinking the FederalLands in RETHINKING FEDERAL
LANDs (Brubaker, ed. 1984).
75. NELSON, supra note 10, at 208-09.
76. Id. at 275, 288.
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as this shift the focus of the debate over public lands allocation choices
by illustrating that there no longer are simple choices between good and
evil. The Making ofFederalCoalPolicy is not a brief for the deregulation
of public lands, but it is one of an increasing number of studies of public
lands policy in all areas, grazing, timber, and recreation, that increasingly
shift the burden to proponents of management programs to demonstrate
that the program is both needed and feasible.

